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I. INTRODUCTION 
Addressing climate change will require a suite of policies and pro-
grams . . . .1  
 
Historically, environmental regulation in the United States has 
occurred piecemeal, reflecting the diverse positions on the topic tak-
en by state legislators, state and federal agencies, the courts, and other 
stakeholders.  Current initiatives to reduce or to regulate carbon are 
no different, as they involve varying levels of regulation and oversight.2  
Even with the passage of a federal cap-and-trade law this complex 
regulatory structure will not change.  As such, public utilities and oth-
ers in the energy sector can expect to be regulated at many different 
levels for the purpose of restricting carbon output.3 
 
 1. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 26,266 
(Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 87, 89).   
 2. See id.   
 3. While carbon regulation will apply to many different areas of industry, this 
article will focus on the impact resulting from regulation on public utilities providing 
retail electricity service to customers.  While each state has a slightly different defini-
2
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In particular, public utilities are rate regulated, which requires 
approval of intrastate retail rates by the state regulatory commission4 
that has jurisdiction over its rates and services.  Rate regulation is of 
particular significance where compliance with carbon regulations 
creates additional costs for public utilities.  With few exceptions, car-
bon regulations do not address a critical driver for a public utility—
who will bear responsibility to pay for the additional expense resulting 
from such regulation?  In the absence of a clear mandate, the answer 
is left open to debate in the hundreds of regulatory and judicial pro-
ceedings that will ensue.  Where a public utility operates in multiple 
states, it may also experience different regulatory treatment of these 
costs, creating disparity between different jurisdictions and challenges 
for the public utility’s resource planning and financial integrity. 
Costs resulting from the generation of electricity, such as fuel and 
generating facilities, are considered part of the operating costs of pro-
viding that service to customers.  In the context of a retail rate setting 
proceeding, a state regulatory commission’s role is to consider wheth-
er the rates identified by the requesting public utility are just and rea-
sonable, and to establish a reasonable return on investment.5  
Current estimates of the costs associated with carbon regulation 
compliance are significant, and consequently could result in requests 
by public utilities for correspondingly significant increases in retail 
 
tion, a “public utility” is typically defined as “a diverse group of businesses that have 
been subjected over several decades to detailed local, state and federal regulation of 
rates and service.”  CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 4 
(3d ed. 1993).  Public utilities can generally be divided into two categories: (1) “those 
enterprises which supply, directly or indirectly, continuous or repeated services 
through more or less permanent physical connection between the [generation] plant 
. . . and the premises of the consumer;” and (2) transportation entities.  Id.  See also 
JAMES C. BONBRIGHT ET. AL., PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES RATES 10 (2d ed. 1988) 
(stating that “an enterprise is not regarded as a public utility, at least for the most 
part, unless the regulation to which it is subject includes direct control of its rates of 
charge for services and a limitation on its allowed rate of return”).  The focus of this 
article will be on the first type of public utility. 
 4. State agencies with the legislative authority to regulate rates, facilities and 
services of private utilities offering retail service are called by a variety of different 
names depending on the individual state (e.g., Public Utilities Commission, Public 
Service Commission, Public Regulation Commission, Board of Public Utilities, etc.).  
This article will generically refer to these entities as “state regulatory commissions.” 
 5. See, e.g., Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2006) (“All rates and charges 
made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection with the 
transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, 
and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges shall be 
just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is he-
reby declared to be unlawful.”). 
3
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rates.  If the public utility does not recover the cost of carbon regula-
tion through its rates, these costs reduce the public utility’s earnings 
and shareholders initially bear the reduced earnings.  The public util-
ity’s profitability, however, impacts its ability to remain investment-
worthy and to borrow capital at reasonable terms for investment in its 
systems and services.  While disallowing carbon costs may initially mi-
tigate a rate impact for electricity customers, this option also has con-
sequences that are magnified by the expected size of the necessary 
rate increase.  Customers will ultimately feel degradation in the public 
utility’s credit status through increases in other costs or in the quality 
of the service provided.  
Additionally, increased regulatory risk and uncertainty for public 
utilities can have a chilling effect on its capital investment.  Where 
costs for carbon regulation are not recovered in rates, it could have a 
corresponding impact on investment in new technologies that are ne-
cessary to substantively address the issue of climate change.  In these 
instances, the negative effects of regulatory uncertainty will not only 
be felt by public utilities, their customers and shareholders, but are 
ultimately likely to harm the environmental cause that the carbon pol-
icy is meant to help. 
This article addresses the types of cost resulting from carbon reg-
ulation and discusses how they should be treated for ratemaking pur-
poses.  First, a summary is provided of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment report that found 
global warming to be “unequivocal.”6  The article next considers vari-
ous carbon initiatives from different branches of government and at 
both the state and federal levels.  The article then considers cost re-
covery for these different carbon costs under fundamental ratemaking 
principles.7  The article concludes that carbon costs and its impacts 
should be dealt with comprehensively and consistently.8  
II. THE IPCC STATES THAT GLOBAL WARMING IS “UNEQUIVOCAL”  
In 2007, the IPCC published its Fourth Assessment Report.9  In 
 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 8. See infra Part V. 
 9. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is a scientific body 
that reviews scientific, technical, and socio-economic information in an effort to un-
derstand global climate change.  See IPCC, Organization, www.ipcc.ch/organization/
organization.htm (last visited on Mar. 28, 2010).  The IPCC was established in 1989 by 
the United Nations Environment Program and the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion.  See IPCC, History, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/organization_history.htm 
4
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that report, the IPCC concluded that global warming is “unequivocal” 
and that human activity “very likely”10 has caused a rise in global tem-
peratures since 1950.11  The report explained that the “primary 
source of the increased atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide 
since the pre-industrial period results from fossil fuel use, with land-
use change providing another significant but smaller contribution.”12  
At the time of the report, the United States accounted for five percent 
of the world’s population, but contributed a quarter of greenhouse 
gas emissions.13   
Based on these conclusions, the IPCC recommended a number 
of adaptation and mitigation strategies.  Among them, and most rele-
vant here, the IPCC recommended that the energy sector adapt by 
strengthening energy efficiency and increasing the use of renewable 
resources, while reducing dependence on a single source of energy—
fossil fuels.14  The IPCC suggested that this could be accomplished by 
“[n]ational energy policies, regulations, and fiscal and financial in-
centives to encourage uses of alternative sources.”15  The IPCC noted 
that this adaption strategy could stimulate new technologies and use 
local resources, but there could also be technological and financial 
 
(last visited on Mar. 28, 2010).  The Organization’s first report was published in 1990.  
Id.  The IPCC won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 (jointly with former U.S. Vice Presi-
dent Al Gore) for its efforts “to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about 
man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measurers that are 
needed to counteract such change.”  Ole Danbolt Mjos, Chairman, The Norwegian 
Nobel Committee, Presentation Speech (Dec. 10, 2007),  http://nobelpeaceprize
.org/en_GB/laureates/laureates-2007/presentation-2007. 
 10. The IPCC’s 2007 report was the first to conclude that human activity was 
“very likely,” or greater than ninety percent, a cause of global warming.  The 2007 
report is available on the IPCC website.  See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ publica-
tions_and_data/ar4/wg1/en/contents.html [hereinafter IPCC PHYSICAL REPORT].  In 
previous IPCC reports, human activity was only sixty-six to ninety percent “likely,” a 
cause of global warming.  IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  SYNTHESIS REPORT 27 (2008), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [herei-
nafter IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT].    
 11. IPCC, SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS 5, 10 (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf [hereinafter 
IPCC 2007 SUMMARY].  See also Elisabeth Rosenthal & Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel 
Calls Global Warming ‘Unequivocal,’ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2007, at A1.  
 12. IPCC PHYSICAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 2. 
 13. See Rosenthal & Revkin, supra note 11, at 2.   
 14. IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 10, at 15 tbl. 4.1.  The IPCC also recom-
mended strengthening the transmission and distribution infrastructure.  Id.  Streng-
thening the transmission and distribution infrastructure is critical as more renewable 
resources come on to the system.     
 15. Id.  
5
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barriers.16  To mitigate global warming, the IPCC recommended “fuel 
switching from coal to [natural] gas; nuclear power; renewable heat 
and power (hydropower, solar, wind, geothermal[,] and bioenergy); 
combined heat and power,” and carbon sequestration.17  The IPCC 
recommended that these mitigation strategies could be accomplished 
by carbon charges on fossil fuels and renewable energy obligations, 
among other policies.18 
The 111th Congress relied in part on these IPCC conclusions 
when drafting carbon regulation legislation in 2009.  Among the con-
gressional findings for American Clean Energy and Security (ACES) 
Act’s Global Warming Pollution Reduction Program, Congress found: 
(1) Global warming poses a significant threat to the na-
tional security, economy, public health and welfare, 
and environment of the United States, as well as of oth-
er nations. 
(2)  Reviews of scientific studies, including by the Intergo-
vernmental Panel on Climate Change and the National 
Academy of Sciences, demonstrate that global warming 
is the result of the combined anthropogenic green-
house gas emissions from numerous sources of all types 
and sizes.  Each increment of emission, when combined 
with other emissions, causes or contributes materially to 
the acceleration and extent of global warming and its 
adverse effects for the lifetime of such gas in the at-
mosphere.  Accordingly, controlling emissions in small 
as well as large amounts is essential to prevent, slow the 
pace of, reduce the threats from, and mitigate global 
warming and its adverse effects.19 
The ACES bill used many of the adaptation and mitigation strat-
egies listed in the IPCC report.20 
III. CARBON REDUCTION INITIATIVES IN ALL BRANCHES OF 
GOVERNMENT CREATE UNEQUIVOCAL CARBON-RELATED COSTS 
Various forms of carbon initiatives impacting the energy sector 
have been commenced by a variety of stakeholders.  All of these initia-
tives create new carbon-related costs—from civil litigation costs and 
 
 16. Id.   
 17. Id. at tbl. 4.2. 
 18. Id.   
 19. American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 
701(a)(1)–(2) (2009). 
 20. See discussion of ACES infra Part III.B.    
6
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potential damages to compliance-related costs—but few of the initia-
tives explicitly provide for cost recovery or explain how these new car-
bon-related costs will be recovered.  
A. Climate Change Litigation 
Climate change litigation, specifically whether plaintiffs can 
maintain a cause of action against oil, energy, and public utilities for 
adverse effects of global warming, create massive potential costs to 
comply with an injunction or civil damages awards.21  Two United 
States Courts of Appeals found that tort liability for global warming is 
a justiciable political question and that plaintiffs have standing to 
maintain a cause of action against oil, energy, and utility companies.22  
One federal district court disagreed.23   
If the plaintiffs ultimately prevail, the defendant public utilities 
may be ordered to reduce or eliminate carbon emissions associated 
with the electricity it provides to customers.  Compliance with such an 
order may require the public utility to incur substantial costs, includ-
ing purchase of alternative carbon neutral power to meet customer 
demand, and eventually the replacement of existing electric genera-
tion resources that emit carbon.24  
 
 21. This article does not address whether civil damages for carbon emissions 
should be included in the cost of service when setting retail rates; but the magnitude 
of such costs for a public utility may be considerable.  See, e.g., Mireya Navarro, States 
Settle With Plant Polluting Region’s Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2009, at A25 (explaining 
that Duke Energy settled a case about the sulfur dioxide emissions from one coal 
plant by paying a $1.75 million civil penalty, committing to spend $80 million to re-
duce the coal plant’s emissions and an additional $6.25 million on other environmen-
tal projects).      
 22. See infra Part III.A.1.   
 23. See infra Part III.A.2.  
 24. For example, if the public utility relies on electricity generated from its own 
carbon-emitting generation plants, it would have to purchase carbon-neutral re-
placement power to continue serving its customers while it prepares to retrofit or re-
place these carbon-emitting generation plants with other carbon-neutral generation 
resources.  Replacement power may cost more than the electricity from its current 
generation plants, and any physical changes to its own generation plant would also 
involve new costs.  If the public utility purchases all of its electricity for resale, it would 
have to negotiate new contracts for carbon-neutral resources, while possibly remain-
ing under contract obligations for its existing resources. 
7
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1. Courts of Appeals hold Global Warming Claims are Justiciable 
and Plaintiffs have Standing: Connecticut v. American Electric 
Power Company Inc. and Comer v. Murphy Oil USA 
In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Company Inc.,25 the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that eight states, New York City, and 
three land trusts had standing to bring federal common law nuisance 
claims against several public utilities26 that own and operate coal-fired 
power plants and that such a nuisance claim did not present a non-
justiciable political question.  The plaintiffs sought to cap and then 
reduce the defendant’s carbon emissions.27 
In 2004, the plaintiffs filed two separate actions against the public 
utilities.  In both actions, the plaintiffs asserted that the public utilities 
were “substantial contributors to elevated levels of carbon dioxide 
and global warming.”28  Citing the causal link between heightened 
greenhouse gases and global warming, the states and New York City 
predicted that global warming “will have substantial adverse impacts 
on their environments, residents, and property, and that it will cost 
billions of dollars to respond to these problems.” 29  The land trusts 
complaint was similar, but alleged a different type of injury—the land 
trusts argued that global warming would “diminish or destroy the par-
ticular ecological and aesthetic values that caused [them] to acquire, 
and cause them to maintain, the properties they hold in trust” and 
 
 25. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).  The 
other court of appeals case is Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).  
In Comer, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that residents and owners of land 
and property along the Mississippi Golf coast have standing to assert Mississippi state 
law public and private nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims against various ener-
gy, fossil fuel, and chemical industries that operate in Mississippi, and that such 
claims do not present non-justiciable political questions.  Id. at 860.  In Comer, the 
plaintiffs sought damages from the defendants for private property that was destroyed 
during Hurricane Katrina.  Id. at 863.  Comer will not be discussed in detail because 
the plaintiffs requested damages, as opposed to an injunction, and the Fifth Circuit’s 
conclusion is similar to the AEP court.  The defendants in AEP and Comer have since 
requested en banc review.  The Fifth Circuit granted en banc review on March 1, 2010. 
 26. Specifically, these utilities are American Electric Power Company Inc., Amer-
ican Electric Power Service Corporation, Southern Company, Tennessee Valley Au-
thority, Xcel Energy Inc., and Cinergy Corporation.  American Electric Power Service 
Corporation is the service company for American Electric Power Company Inc.; the 
service company provides management and professional services for AEP’s operating 
companies, but the service company does not generate carbon dioxide emissions.  
AEP, 582 F.3d at 316 n.1.   
 27. Id. at 314. 
 28. Id. at 316–18 (states’ and New York City’s claims); id. at 318–19 (land trusts’ 
claims).     
 29. Id. at 317.   
8
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would “interfer[e] with their efforts to preserve ecologically signifi-
cant and sensitive land for scientific and educational purposes, and 
for human use and enjoyment.”30   
The Southern District of New York dismissed both complaints, 
finding that the case presented a non-justiciable political question.31  
In so holding, the court relied heavily on the third factor of the politi-
cal question inquiry provided in Baker v. Carr.32  The third Baker factor 
suggests there is a non-justiciable political question when it is “impos-
sib[le] [to] decid[e] without an initial policy determination of a kind 
clearly for non-judicial discretion.”33  The district court held that ini-
tial policy determinations had to be made by the elected branches of 
government before a court could adjudicate the case.34  The district 
court did not address directly the standing issue because of its deter-
mination on the political question.35 
More than three years after oral argument, the Second Circuit 
decided the case, overruling the district court and finding that the 
plaintiffs had standing to bring nuisance claims against the public util-
ities.36  The court started its analysis of the political question doctrine 
by noting that “Baker set a high bar for non-justiciability.”37  The court 
then analyzed all six of the Baker factors.38  The court’s analysis fo-
cused on the second and third Baker factors—that is, whether there 
was a lack of judicially-discoverable and manageable standards for re-
solving the case and whether it was impossible to decide the case 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion.   
The public utilities argued that neither public nuisance cases nor 
the Second Restatement of Torts39 provided guidance on the potential 
 
 30. Id. at 319.   
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 319–20 (discussing the district court’s application of the factors out-
lined in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)). 
 33. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309, 319 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)). 
 34. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272–73 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).   
 35. Id. at 271 n.6. 
 36. AEP, 582 F.3d at 315. The Honorable Justice Sonia Sotomayor was a member 
of the panel who considered the AEP case, but was appointed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court before the case was decided.  The case was therefore decided only by the two 
remaining members of the panel.  Id. at 314 n.*.   
 37. Id. at 321.    
 38. Id. at 323–32.  When a Baker factor is present, it suggests a non-justiciable po-
litical question.   
 39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).  
9
Hertzler and Koeller: Who Pays for Carbon Costs? Uncertainty and Risk in Response to th
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
 
2010] WHO PAYS FOR CARBON COSTS? 913 
complex issues in global warming–related nuisance cases.40  The court 
disagreed, citing cases where federal courts “grappled with complex 
scientific evidence, and resolved the issues presented, based on a fully 
developed record.”41  The court held that “[w]ell-settled principles of 
tort and public nuisance law provide appropriate guidance to the dis-
trict court in assessing Plaintiffs’ claims and the federal courts are 
competent to deal with these issues.”42 
The court of appeals also disagreed with the district court’s con-
clusion that the elected branches needed to make an initial policy de-
termination on the case.  The court of appeals relied on Illinois v. City 
of Milwaukee,43 finding that if a federal statute, like the Clean Air Act, 
does not provide the plaintiffs with a remedy, the plaintiff does not 
have to wait for Congress to enact comprehensive legislation that pro-
vides a remedy.44  Instead, the plaintiff can rely on the federal com-
mon law.45  After reviewing the other Baker factors, the court held 
“that the district court erred when it dismissed the complaints on the 
ground that they presented non-justiciable political questions.” 46 
The court next addressed the standing issues.47  Under Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife,48 the Supreme Court provided a three-part test for 
standing: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete 
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjec-
tural or hypothetical.  Second, there must be a causal con-
nection between the injury and the conduct complained 
 
 40. AEP, 582 F.3d at 326.   
 41. Id. at 327 (citing New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931); North 
Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 
(1921); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 
(1851)).   
 42. Id. at 329.    
 43. 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 
 44. AEP, 582 F.3d at 330–31.   
 45. Id.    
 46. Id. at 332.   
 47. The court first addressed the States’s parens patriae standing.  To have parens 
patriae standing, “[a] state: (1) ‘must articulate an interest apart from the interests of 
particular private parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party’; (2) ‘must 
express a quasi-sovereign interest’; and (3) must have ‘alleged injury to a sufficiently 
substantial segment of its population.’”  Id. at 335–36 (citing Snapp v. Puerto Rico ex 
rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)).  The court found that the States met the test for 
parens patriae standing.  Id. at 338.  The court’s analysis will not be detailed in this ar-
ticle because the plaintiffs in Native Village of Kivalina, discussed infra Part III.2, are 
not states.   
 48. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).   
10
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of—the injury has to be fairly trace[able] to the challenged 
action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the in-
dependent action of some third party not before the court.  
Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, 
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.49 
The court found that all of the plaintiffs satisfied the injury in 
fact prong of the Lujan test.50  Only one state, California, showed a 
current injury in fact.51  The rest of the states, New York City and the 
land trusts all alleged a future injury.  For example, the states with 
ocean coastline and New York City argued that the rise in sea level 
caused by global warming will lead to more floods resulting in damage 
to infrastructure.52  The court included a quotation from Massachusetts 
v. Environmental Protection Agency,53 in order to explain that incremen-
tal injuries did not foreclose finding an injury in fact: “Petitioners [in 
Massachusetts v. EPA] maintain that the seas are rising and will contin-
ue to rise, and have alleged that such a rise will lead to the loss of Mas-
sachusetts’ sovereign territory.  No one, save perhaps the dissenters, 
disputes those allegations.  Our cases require nothing more.”54  The 
court further concluded that the risk of catastrophic harm to the 
plaintiffs, though remote, was real and therefore the plaintiffs suffi-
ciently alleged a future injury.55 
Regarding causation, the court noted that causation required for 
standing is not a tort-like causation requirement; instead, the injury 
must be “fairly traceable” to the actions of the defendants.56  Both 
sides relied on Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Powell 
Duffryn Terminals, Inc.57 and its progeny.  In Powell Duffryn, the court 
provided a three-part test to determine whether an injury is fairly tra-
ceable to a defendant’s discharge of pollutants: 
[T]his likelihood may be established by showing that a de-
fendant has (1) discharged some pollutant in concentra-
 
 49. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309, 339 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (citations omitted)).   
 50. Id. at 344. 
 51. Id. at 341.  The State of California alleged reduced snowpack and asserted 
that the reduced snowpack negatively impacted water supplies and caused flood-
related property damage.  Id. at 341.  
 52. Id. at 342.   
 53. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  
 54. AEP, 582 F.3d at 344 (quoting Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 
497, 523 n.21 (2007)).   
 55. Id. at 344.  
 56. Id. at 345. 
 57. 913 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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tions greater than allowed by its permit (2) into a waterway 
in which the plaintiffs have an interest that is or may be ad-
versely affected by the pollutant and that (3) this pollutant 
causes or contributes to the kinds of injuries alleged by the 
plaintiffs.58 
The defendants tried to distinguish Powell Duffryn based on the 
first prong of the test.  The court rejected the defendant’s argument 
and held that the causation element was met in that case because the 
defendants contributed to the types of injuries alleged.59  Finally, the 
court found that the plaintiffs’ claims satisfied the redressibility prong 
of the standing test because the reduction of domestic emissions 
would slow the pace of global emissions.60   
The court then analyzed the defendant public utilities’ Rule 
12(b)(6) motion.  The court found that all of the plaintiffs stated 
claims under the federal common law of nuisance.  The court there-
fore vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case 
for further proceedings.61 
2. Federal District Court holds Global Warming Claims are not 
Justiciable under the Political Question Doctrine and Plaintiffs do not 
have Standing: Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil 
Corporation 
In contrast to AEP and Comer, the Northern District of California 
dismissed a climate change claim in Native Village of Kivalina v. Ex-
xonMobil Corporation.62  In that case, the governing body of an Inupiat 
Eskimo village and the City of Kivalina (collectively, the Kivalina Plain-
tiffs) filed suit against twenty-four oil, energy, and utility companies 
(collectively, the Kivalina Defendants).63  The Kivalina Plaintiffs 
 
 58. AEP, 582 F.3d at 346 (quoting Powell Duffryn, 913 F.2d at 72).   
 59. Id. at 347.   
 60. Id. at 347–49.   
 61. The court of appeals also found that the plaintiffs’ claims were not displaced 
by federal law and that the discretionary function exception does not provide one of 
the defendants, the Tennessee Valley Authority, with immunity from suit.  See id. at 
371–92.  The displacement theory is discussed infra Part III.D.  The Tennessee Valley 
Authority’s claim need not be discussed for the purposes of this article.   
 62. Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction at 7, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. 08-CV-01138, (N.D. 
Cal. granted Sept. 30, 2009).  The Native Village of Kivalina has filed a notice of ap-
peal.  
 63. Id. at 1.  The defendants in the Kivalina case were: (1) ExxonMobil Corpora-
tion; (2) BP P.L.C.; (3) BP America, Inc.; (4) BP Products North America, Inc.; (5) 
Chevron Corporation; (6) Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; (7) ConocoPhillips Company; (8) 
Royal Dutch Shell P.L.C.; (9) Shell Oil Company; (10) Peabody Energy Corporation; 
12
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sought damages under a nuisance theory, asserting that the Kivalina 
Defendants’ emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
had caused global warming.  The Kivalina Plaintiffs argued that, as a 
result of global warming, the sea ice that protects the City of Kivalina 
is thinner and less extensive than it was previously, making the City 
uninhabitable and necessitating the relocation of its residents.64 
The Kivalina Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.65  The Kivalina Defendants argued that the 
claims were not justiciable under the political question doctrine and 
that the Kivalina Plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution.66  The court agreed.67   
In considering whether the Kivalina Plaintiffs’ claim presented a 
political question, the court considered the factors provided in Baker 
v. Carr,68 as synthesized under Wang v. Masaitis:69  
 Justice Powell distilled the Baker test into three inquiries: 
“(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions commit-
ted by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of 
government?  (ii) Would resolution of the question demand 
that a court move beyond areas of judicial expertise?  (iii) 
Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial inter-
vention?”70 
 
(11) The AES Corporation; (12) American Electric Power Corporation; (13) Ameri-
can Electric Power Services Corporation; (14) DTE Energy Company; (15) Duke 
Energy Corporation; (16) Dynergy Holdings, Inc.; (17) Edison International; (18) 
Mid-American Energy Holdings Company; (19) Mirant Corporation; (20) NRG Ener-
gy; (21) Pinnacle West Capital Corporation; (22) Reliant Energy, Inc.; (23) The 
Southern Company; and (24) Xcel Energy Inc.  Id. at n.1. 
 64. Id. at 2.   
 65. Id.   
 66. Id.   
 67. Id. at 24.   
 68. Id. at 7 (discussing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)).  Under Baker v. Carr, 
any of the following demonstrate that the issue is a non-justiciable political question: 
[1] [A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and 
management standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial dis-
cretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent reso-
lution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a po-
litical decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 
369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
 69. 416 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 
998 (1979)).   
 70. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863, 872 (N.D. 
13
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Under the first inquiry, the Kivalina Defendants argued that 
global warming was a foreign policy issue and therefore resolution of 
the issue would interfere with the political branches’ authority over 
foreign policy.71  The court found that global warming was not exclu-
sively a foreign policy issue and therefore resolution of the issue was 
not conclusively within the authority of the political branches of gov-
ernment.72   
The court concluded that the case was non-justiciable under the 
second inquiry relating to judicial expertise.  The Kivalina Plaintiffs 
first argued that the law provided judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards because the standards are the same for all nuisance 
cases—the court must determine “whether Defendants contributed 
to ‘an unreasonable interference with public rights.’”73  The court 
disagreed because resolution of a nuisance claim requires “weighing 
‘the gravity of the harm against the utility of the conduct.’”74  The 
court reasoned that the case would require weighing “the energy-
producing alternatives that were available in the past and consider 
their respective impact on far ranging issues such as reliability as an 
energy source, safety considerations and the impact of the different 
alternatives on consumers and business at every level” with the “bene-
fits derived from those choices against the risk that increasing green-
house gases would in turn increase the risk of causing flooding along 
the coast of a remote Alaskan locale.”75  The court concluded that 
there were no judicially discoverable or manageable standards to 
guide the fact-finder in making a decision on this issue.76   
The Kivalina Plaintiffs next argued that air and water pollution 
cases create judicially discoverable or manageable standards.  The 
court disagreed with the reasoning of the AEP court, finding that the 
well-settled principles of tort and public nuisance law do not provide 
sufficient guidance to decide the case.  The court distinguished global 
warming cases from other environmental cases tried under a tort or 
nuisance theory.  In those cases, there were “a discrete number of 
‘polluters’ that were identified as causing a specific injury to a specific 
area.”77  Further, the sequence of events leading up to other envi-
 
Cal. 2009) (quoting Wang, 416 F.3d at 995).   
 71. Id. at 872–73.   
 72. Id. at 873.   
 73. Id. at 874 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Motion in Opposition at 63).   
 74. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 cmt. e (1979)).   
 75. Id. at 874–75. 
 76. Id. at 875.   
 77. Id.   
14
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ronmental litigation cases was more direct.78  Because the court found 
that there were no judicially discoverable and manageable standards, 
the court concluded that the case presented a political question and 
was non-justiciable; thus the court did not consider the third inquiry 
of the political question doctrine. 
On the issue of standing, the court found that the case did not 
meet the causation requirement for standing.79  The damage caused 
to the Kivalina coastline through global warming is attributable to 
many entities over the course of hundreds of years.  The court ex-
plained that the Kivalina Defendants were not the seed of the Kivalina 
Plaintiffs’ injury, and therefore found that the case lacked Article III 
standing.80   
B. Federal Legislation—American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009   
Although the federal courts have been considering the issue of 
responsibility for climate change in the absence of a federal policy, 
Congress proposed legislation in 2009 that ultimately intended to co-
dify such policy and create a regulatory structure aimed at reducing 
the amount of carbon emitted in the United States.81  If enacted, such 
legislation would result in new costs stemming from the regulation of 
carbon emissions, but does not appear to completely preclude the risk 
of injunction from the type of litigation summarized above. 82 
 
 78. Id. at 875–76 (citing Texas Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Ass’n v. 
E.P.A., 410 F.3d 964, 974 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that a discharge in excess of the 
amount prescribed is presumed harmful in a water pollution case)).   
 79. Id. at 877–82.  To have Article III standing a plaintiff must establish 
an injury in fact (i.e., a “concrete and particularized” invasion of a “legally 
protected interest”); (2) causation (i.e., a “‘fairly . . . trace[able]’” connec-
tion between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the de-
fendant); and (3) redressibility (i.e., it is “‘likely’” and not “merely ‘specula-
tive’” that the plaintiff’s injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks 
in bringing suit). 
Id. at 877 (citing Sprint Comm’n Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 
(2008)).   
 80. Id. at 880–81. 
 81. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 111TH CONG., DISCUSSION 
DRAFT SUMMARY, THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY & SECURITY ACT OF 2009 1 (2009). 
 82. Nevertheless, by Congress setting caps on greenhouse gas emissions, if ACES 
passes, one can make a stronger case for dismissing such litigation on the basis of a 
political question, as there is no longer a political vacuum on this issue.  Sally Roberts, 
More Public Nuisance Suits Could Arise from Recent Court Decisions, BUS. INS., Nov. 23, 
2009, at 18, available at http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20091122/
ISSUE03/311229994.  
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1. ACES Generally 
H.R. 2454—the America Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 
(ACES)—passed the U.S. House of Representatives by a vote of 219–
211 on June 26, 2009.83  The bill is best known for its cap-and-trade 
system, discussed below.  The bill also requires public utilities who 
generate electricity to provide a certain percentage of their load with 
electricity from renewable resources (i.e., a renewable energy stan-
dard), and encourages use of “smart grid” and carbon capture and 
sequestration technologies.84  Reducing emissions and complying with 
renewable energy standards in ACES will create considerable costs for 
public utilities.   
2. The Cap and Trade System under ACES 
The cap-and-trade system under ACES covers emissions from 
electric utilities and other entities that account for eighty-five percent 
of emissions in the United States.  The system provides allowances to 
covered entities,85 thereby allowing them to emit a certain amount of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHGs).86  Covered enti-
ties can also offset their carbon emissions.87 
a. Allowances 
Under ACES, covered entities would need allowances to emit 
GHGs.  An allowance is equal to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent 
of GHGs.88  ACES specifically prescribes the number of allowances 
available for each calendar year.89  If ACES were enacted, the cap and 
 
 83. At the time of publication, the U.S. Senate had not acted on ACES.  Accor-
dingly, this article only considers the bill as approved by the House. 
 84. Details of ACES’s renewable energy standards, smart grid, and carbon cap-
ture and sequestration policies are beyond the scope of this article.   
 85. American Clean Energy and Security Act [ACES], H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 
700(13) (2009). 
 86. Section 711(a) defines greenhouse gases to include: “(1) Carbon dioxide.  
(2) Methane.  (3) Nitrous oxide.  (4) Sulfur hexafluoride.  (5) Hyprofluorocarbons 
[emitted] from a chemical manufacturing process at an industrial stationary source.  
(6) Any perfluorocarbon.  (7) Nitrogen trifluoride[,] [and] (8) Any other anthropo-
genic gas designated as a greenhouse gas by the [EPA] Administrator under this sec-
tion.”  § 711(a)(1)–(8). 
 87. § 732. 
 88. Each GHG listed in note 86 is expressed in terms of carbon dioxide equiva-
lents.  For example, one metric ton of methane is equal to twenty-five metric tons of 
carbon dioxide.  See § 712 (b)(1).   
 89. § 721.   
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss3/9
 
920 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
trade system would start in 2012, covering emissions from electric ge-
nerators, refiners and importers of electric fuel, and fluorinated gas 
manufacturers.90  In 2014, industrial stationary sources would be add-
ed to the cap and trade system, and natural gas local distribution 
companies would be added to the program in 2016.91  Emissions al-
lowances would decrease each year and, in 2050, level off to 17% of 
the quantity of GHG emissions in 2005.92  This would translate to an 




In addition to prescribing the number of allowances available, 
ACES also prescribes to whom the allowances will be allocated.93  Un-
der ACES, the majority of the allowances would be allocated to specif-
ic stakeholders in 2012, when the cap and trade system is proposed to 
start.  By 2030, approximately 25% of the allowances would be allo-
cated to specific stakeholders; the rest of the allowances would be 
available for trade or purchase on the market.   
In 2012 and 2013, 43.75% of the allowances available would be al-
located to public utilities (or “local distribution companies” as they 
 
 90. See § 700(13)(A)–(C) & (E) (providing proposed covered entities involved in 
the cap-and-trade program in 2012).   
 91. See § 721(c).   
 92. § 702(4).   
 93. See generally § 782 (describing emissions allowances).   
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are referenced in ACES) for the benefit of their electricity consum-
ers.94  The percentage of allowances allocated for the benefit of elec-
tricity customers would drop to 38.89% in 2014 and 2015, and 35% 
from 2016 to 2025.95  From 2026 to 2029, the percentage of allowances 
allocated to electricity customers would drop annually by 7%.96  The 
number of allowances allocated to a specific public utility would be 
50% based on historic emissions and 50% based on annual average 
retail electricity deliveries.97  By 2030, no allowances would be allo-




Each covered entity (which includes public utilities) is generally 
prohibited from emitting GHGs in excess of its allowances.98  If a cov-
ered entity will emit more tons of carbon dioxide equivalents than al-
lotted in a particular year, the covered entity can trade, buy, or bor-
 
 94. § 782(a)(1)(A).   
 95. § 782(a)(1)(B) and (C). 
 96. § 782(a)(1)(D)–(G).   
 97. § 782(b)(2) and (3).   
 98. See § 722(a).   
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row allowances to comply with ACES.   
Each covered entity (which includes public utilities) would be 
generally prohibited from emitting GHGs in excess of its allowances.99  
If a covered entity would emit more tons of carbon dioxide equiva-
lents than allotted in a particular year, the covered entity could trade, 
buy, or borrow allowances to comply with ACES.   
Allowances would be tradable.100  Subject to certain limitations 
(not relevant here), a holder of an emissions allowance could “with-
out restriction, sell, exchange, transfer, hold for compliance . . . , or 
request that the Administrator [of the EPA] retire the emission allow-
ance.”101  Thus, a covered entity would be able to buy allowances from 
other covered entities that, because of the resources on their system, 
did not need all of their allowances in a given year.  
Covered entities could also buy allowances from the EPA strategic 
reserve.102  Under ACES, the EPA would be directed to create a stra-
tegic reserve of allowances, which would contain one to three percent 
of the quantity of allowances for a certain year.103  The EPA would auc-
tion off the allowances from the strategic reserve on a quarterly ba-
sis.104  The EPA would auction off approximately 18% of allowances in 
2014 and then it would gradually increase this number until 2031 
when approximately 70% of the allowances would be auctioned.105 
Finally, covered entities could also bank their allowances to satisfy 
future compliance.106  Covered entities could borrow emissions allow-
ances without interest from the calendar year immediately following 
the compliance year.107  A covered entity could also borrow some of its 
own future allowances with a prepayment of interest.108 
 
 99. See § 722(a).   
 100. § 724. 
 101. § 724(a).  Even though allowances and offsets are tradable, neither one con-
stitutes a property right.  § 721(c)(1).    
 102. § 726(b)(1). 
 103. § 726(b)(1)(B).   
 104. § 726(a)(1).  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission will regulate the 
cash market of allowances and offsets.  § 761.   
 105. See § 726(d) (quantifying the level of allowances released by the reserve per 
year). 
 106. § 725. 
 107. § 725(c)(1).   
 108. § 725(c)(2).  Under ACES section 725(c)(2)(C), the interest payment is a 
portion of emission allowances (i.e., the product of 0.08 and “the number of years 
between the calendar year in which the allowance is being used to satisfy a com-
pliance obligation and the [year for which the allowance was originally intended]”). 
19
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b. Offsets 
A covered entity could also satisfy compliance by offsetting emis-
sions.  Covered entities could obtain offset credits by conducting EPA 
certified actions that reduce GHG emissions or increase the amount 
of GHGs that are sequestered.109  “Examples of such offset activities 
include reducing emissions of methane gas from solid waste landfills, 
sequestering GHGs on agricultural lands, rangelands, and forests, al-
tering agricultural tillage practices, planting winter crops, and reduc-
ing the use of nitrogen fertilizer.”110  A covered entity would get one 
offset credit for each carbon dioxide equivalent that “has been re-
duced, avoided, or sequestered.”111 
c. Cost Recovery Under ACES 
Although ACES develops a rigid framework dictating the alloca-
tion of benefits associated with carbon allowances to different groups, 
it does not mandate specific compliance cost policies.112  This silence 
leaves the issue open for possible rulemaking by the EPA or FERC, or 
in the absence of such rulemaking, to state regulatory commissions 
who have traditionally had jurisdiction over the setting of intrastate 
retail rates.113  
One advantage of federal rulemaking on this issue would be the 
resulting consistent application of any codified cost recovery or ac-
counting treatment for carbon costs.114  Where the EPA or FERC is-
 
 109. See § 731(d) (instructing EPA to create an Offsets Integrity Advisory Board, 
which will make recommendations about which offset types will be eligible for com-
pliance purposes).  See also § 722 (directing the EPA to give priority to the Advisory 
Board recommendations in creating a list of eligible offset project types).  Similar to 
allowances, an offset can be sold, traded, or transferred unless it has been used or has 
expired.  § 742.   
 110. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, H.R. 2454 AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND 
SECURITY ACT OF 2009, COST ESTIMATE 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10262/hr2454.pdf. 
 111. H.R. 2454 § 737(b). 
 112. § 783(b)(5)(A).  The silence of ACES is a change from earlier environmental 
policy proposals considered by Congress.  In 2007, Reps. Udall (D-NM) and Platts (R-
PA) developed a proposal which would have required state regulatory agencies to pass 
through compliance costs resulting from a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard.  
The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) opposed the 
proposal, which was never adopted.  Press Release, National Association of Regulatory 
Utility Commissioners, RPS-Compliance Costs Decisions Best Left to States, NARUC 
Tells Congress (Aug. 2, 2007), http://www.naruc.org/News/default.cfm?pr=42&pdf. 
 113. See infra Part III.D. 
 114. See, e.g., Uniform System of Accounts Prescribed for Public Utilities and Li-
censees Subject to the Provisions of the Federal Power Act, 18 C.F.R. pt. 101 (2010) 
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sued a rule directing specific regulatory treatment of carbon costs, it 
would ensure that the issue would be treated consistently in all subse-
quent rate-setting proceedings at the state level.  However, with the 
silence of ACES on this issue, it is not clear whether it is envisioned 
that either federal agency would have the proper jurisdiction. 115 
Regardless of whether it is considered at the federal or state level, 
in making a determination as to who pays for compliance, the enact-
ing provisions of ACES may be helpful.  The Act allocates allowances 
to retail customers, which suggests an expectation that they will bear 
the cost of compliance and thus should receive some of the allow-
ances to offset this burden.  Additionally, ACES anticipates that the 
distribution of allowances may occur through a rate setting proceed-
ing, which by its nature would involve the consideration of those costs 
incurred by the public utility from the provision of electricity ser-
vice.116 
Ultimately, ACES does not resolve the question of cost recovery, 
and prior judicial and state regulatory commission decisions govern-
ing ratemaking will likely be the best guide for future treatment of 
compliance costs.  
C. State Initiatives   
1. Renewable Resource Mandates 
Most states have a regulatory commission that regulates the pub-
lic utilities operating within that state, but the scope of authority and 
specific direction given to each entity regarding environmental regu-
lation varies considerably.117  Some states require the regulatory com-
 
(offering an example of the uniformity under a federally regulated system, in this 
case for public utilities).   
 115. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 476 U.S. 355, 374 
(1986) (“While it is certainly true, and a basic underpinning of our federal system, 
that state regulation will be displaced to the extent that it stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress . . . it 
is also true that a federal agency may pre-empt state law only when and if it is acting 
within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority.”).   
 116. Before a public utility can receive allowances on behalf of its customers, a 
state regulatory commission must, after notice and comment, promulgate a regula-
tion or complete a rate case which fully implements the distribution envisioned in 
ACES.  H.R. 2454 § 783(b)(6)(A)(i). 
 117. See, e.g., Michael Dworkin, David Farnsworth, Jason Rich & Jason Salmi Klotz, 
The Environmental Duties for Public Utilities Commissions for 2006, 7 VA.  ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9–
69 (2006) (listing each state regulatory commission’s general authority and obliga-
tions as provided by statute).   
21
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mission to consider environmental costs when approving a new re-
source (e.g., a coal plant or high voltage transmission line serving a 
coal plant).118  Other state legislatures have enacted provisions that 
explicitly prohibit the state regulatory commission from considering 
environmental costs when approving a new generation resource or 
setting rates for retail service.119   
Public utilities increasingly operate in more than one state.120  
Where two states differ on environmental policy, it creates the poten-
tial for inconsistent rate treatment for the public utility that operates 
in both.  The current inconsistent treatment of environmental exter-
nalities (which could include carbon) among states puts the public 
utility at risk for stranded costs when it seeks to recover the likely 
higher cost of electricity generated from renewable resources con-
sumed by customers in more than one state.121   
This existing conflict will likely continue for the recovery of car-
bon-related costs.  For example, if the cost associated with carbon 
regulation is allocated on a per-customer or usage basis, with the pub-
lic utility’s customer base straddling more than one state, the disal-
lowance of these costs by one of the state regulatory commissions will 
create a stranded cost for the public utility.  Depending on the magni-
tude of the potential stranded costs, the disallowance of prudently in-
curred costs could also reach constitutional dimensions if it affects the 
public utility’s ability to earn a reasonable return.122  Conflicting poli-
 
 118. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701.1(c) (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-
2-123(1)(a), (b) (West Supp. 2009) (requiring the commission to give consideration 
to the likelihood of new environmental regulations and the risk of higher future costs 
associated with the emission of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, when it 
considers utility proposals to acquire resources); see also MINN. STAT. § 216B.243 sub-
divs. 3, 3(a) (2008) (explaining that when a public utility proposes to build a nonre-
newable generating plant, the utility must factor in the risk of environmental costs 
over the expected useful life of the plant and how the utility plans to allocate those 
costs).  
 119. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-23 (1999) (providing that the North Dakota 
Public Utility Commission may not use environmental cost externalities, including 
possible costs of complying with future, not yet enacted, environmental laws, in plan-
ning or selecting electric resources or establishing rates for service).   
 120. For example, American Electric Power (AEP) merged with Central and 
Southwest Corporation in 2000.  Am. Elec. Power Co. & Ctr. Sw. Corp., Opinion No. 
442, 90 FERC ¶ 61,242, 61,776 (2000), order on reh’g 91 FERC ¶ 61,129 (2000), aff’d 
sub nom. Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, Inc. v. FERC, 268 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
AEP currently operates in eleven states: Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.  AEP, 
About Us, http://www.aep.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 121. See supra notes 118, 119.   
 122. See infra Part IV.E. 
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cies and inconsistent approaches between different states can also 
trigger other constitutional concerns, heightening the level of legal 
and political tensions that can result in inconsistent treatment.123 
2. Regional Cap-and-Trade programs 
Some state legislatures have also conferred jurisdiction in the 
state regulatory commissions to regulate carbon through cap and 
trade mechanisms.  Two regional cap-and-trade programs currently 
dominate in the United States: the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initia-
tive (RGGI) and the Western Climate Initiative (WCI).124   
RGGI is the country’s first mandatory regional carbon cap-and-
trade program, including ten states located in the eastern part of the 
United States.125  In addition, as a mandatory program RGGI is viewed 
as the closest model in the United States for a federal cap-and-trade 
program.126   
All fossil fueled electric power generation plants located in the 
 
 123. For example, the State of North Dakota has announced its intent to bring 
suit over the constitutionality of Minnesota’s statute that requires the consideration of 
carbon in resource selection, as it creates higher electricity rates for retail customers.  
Dale Wetzel, North Dakota Lawsuit Likely Over Minnesota Carbon Dioxide Tax, THE 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 29, 2009, http://www.ajc.com/business/nd-lawsuit-likely-over-
261425.html.  This is not the first time that the Minnesota courts have reviewed a pol-
icy conflict between Minnesota and North Dakota over the issue of using carbon val-
ues.  See In re Quantification of Envtl. Costs, 578 N.W.2d 794, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1998) (upholding the MPUC’s order setting carbon dioxide values and deferring a 
decision on constitutional issues).  
 124. See Existing Cap and Trade Programs to Cut Global Warming Emissions, Un-
ion of Concerned Scientists, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/solutions/
big_picture_solutions/regional-cap-and-trade.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) [he-
reinafter Existing Cap and Trade Programs].  The Midwest Governors’ Association 
also commenced a regional climate change policy process.  See Midwestern Green-
house Gas Reduction Accord, http://www.midwesternaccord.org (last visited Mar. 28, 
2010) [hereinafter Midwestern Accord].  If ACES were to be enacted, however, then 
these regional cap-and-trade programs would be preempted.  See HR. 2454, 111th 
Cong. § 861 (2009).  
 125. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI, 
http://www.rggi.org/about (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter About RGGI].  
The ten participating states include: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  Id.       
 126. See Tracey D. Samuelson, What A National Cap –and-Trade Program Might Look 
Like, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 27, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Global-Issues/2009/0627/p25s12-wogi.html (stating that many pieces of RGGI’s 
working model have been included in ACES); Hal Weitzman, RGGI: Mandatory Scheme 
Makes Modest Gains in North-West, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, at 2 (“As Washington has 
debated the subject, it has often looked to RGGI as the closest US model for its legis-
lation. The programme’s backers say it has always been intended to be a path to a 
federal regime.”).  
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ten state region that are greater than twenty-five megawatts are re-
quired to participate,127 which amounts to approximately 225 generat-
ing facilities.128  Allowances are allocated to individual states based 
primarily on average annual emission occurring from 2002–2004.129  
The participating states have generally agreed to contribute all of 
their allowances to centrally administered auctions and use the 
proceeds to fund efficiency improvement and renewable energy 
projects.130  Beginning in 2009, regional carbon emissions were capped 
at approximately 180 million tons; the cap begins declining by 2.5% 
per year in 2015, achieving the program’s overall goal of reducing 
emissions 10% in 2018.131  To date, RGGI has conducted five auc-
tions.132   
Of the ten states participating in RGGI, two have generically ad-
dressed the recovery of resulting carbon costs for the public utilities 
operating in their states, and the remaining eight states have adopted 
retail electric competition.133  New Hampshire’s enabling statute states 
 
 127. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Overview of RGGI CO2 Budget 
Trading Program 2 (Oct. 2007), http://rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf 
[hereinafter RGGI Overview]; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule, subpart 1.4 (Dec. 31, 2008), 
http://rggi.org/docs/Model%20Rule%20Revised%2012.31.08.pdf [hereinafter 
RGGI Model Rule].  
 128. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI Fact Sheet, http://www.rggi.org/
docs/RGGI_Executive%20Summary_4.22.09.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) [herei-
nafter RGGI Fact Sheet]. 
 129. See RGGI Overview, supra note 127. 
 130. RGGI Fact Sheet, supra note 128. 
 131. RGGI Overview, supra note 127. 
 132. RGGI has auctioned more than 110 million allowances since the first auction 
in September 2008, raising $366.5 million.  Mary Esch, Greenhouse Gas Auction Nets 
$104 Million, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 19, 2009,  http://www.thestreet.com/story/
10521467/greenhouse-gas-auction-nets-104-million.html.  “The states are using the 
proceeds to weatherize low-income homes, hire and train energy efficiency auditors, 
subsidize energy efficiency upgrades for small businesses and educate contractors, 
among other things.”  Id. 
 133. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Participating States Regulation, 
http://rggi.org/states/state_regulations (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) [hereinafter 
RGGI State Regulations] (listing the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative participating 
states and the specifics for each state’s corresponding regulatory scheme).  In these 
states, state regulatory commissions still set transmission and distribution rates 
charged by public utilities, but they have ceded rate authority over generation to the 
competitive markets.  Because the RGGI compliance is the responsibility of electric 
generators, compliance costs in these states are embedded in the price customers pay 
for the generation of electricity.  For states that have not implemented retail competi-
tion, state regulatory commissions retain jurisdiction over the generation component 
of electric service.  See Paul Davidson, Shocking Prices Follow Deregulation; States that 
Dropped Price Caps Watch and Worry as Rates Soar, USA TODAY, Aug. 10, 2007, at 1B (of-
24
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that RGGI compliance costs are recoverable in default service rates.134  
Although lacking a specific statute directing its decision, the Vermont 
Department of Public Service has also indicated it believes RGGI 
compliance cost should be recoverable.135  Both of these state pro-
nouncements recognize that the compliance costs are legitimate costs 
of providing electricity service to be borne by the end user. 
In addition to RGGI, seven states in the western United States 
have also formed a cap-and-trade program.136  In February 2007, the 
governors of five western states entered into an agreement to form the 
Western Climate Initiative.137  Since the original agreement was 
signed, two additional states and four Canadian provinces have be-
come fully participating members.138  In early 2009, WCI circulated 
design recommendations for its cap-and-trade program, which are 
currently under review at the state level.139  Under these proposed 
plans, sources that emit 25,000 metric tons of carbon annually will be 
covered under the WCI program, which is scheduled to commence 
 
fering more information regarding deregulation effects); see also Electricity Basics, 
Texas Electric Choice Education Program, http://www.powertochoose.org/
_content/_about/electricity_basics.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (giving back-
ground information regarding Texas’ Electric Choice Education Program and offer-
ing an example of the competitive market for electricity service in one particular 
state); Coping With High Energy Prices, Penn State College of Agricultural Sciences, 
http://energy.cas.psu.edu/facts.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (outlining facts and 
information about deregulation legislation in Pennsylvania).   
 134. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-O:28 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (stating that 
“all prudently incurred cost of complying” with the RGGI program will be recovered 
through the utility’s default service charge). 
 135. See VERMONT  DEPT. OF PUB. SERV., VERMONT COMPREHENSIVE ENERGY PLAN  
2009, PUBLIC REVIEW DRAFT III-81 (May 2008) http://publicservice.vermont.gov/
 planning/CEP%20%20WEB%20DRAFT%20FINAL%206-4-08.pdf (stating that 
because “the acquisition of these certificates effectively becomes a cost of doing 
business for generators, the cost of certificates will become embedded in the market 
price for electricity”). 
 136. See Western Climate Initiative, About the WCI, History, 
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/history (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter WCI History].   
 137. Id.  
 138. Id.  Current partners include Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Utah, and Washington; and the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, 
Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec.  Id.   See also Western Climate Initiative, About the 
WCI, WCI Partners, www.westernclimateinitiative.org/wci-partners (last visited Mar. 
28, 2010) [hereinafter WCI Partners].   
 139. See Western Climate Initiative, Partner Climate Action Plans, 
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/climate-action-plans (last visited Mar. 28, 
2010) (displaying the individual state action plans for participating partners) [herei-
nafter WCI Climate Action Plans].  
25
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January 1, 2012.140 
One of the WCI participating states has also generically addressed 
cost recovery for compliance with the program.  The California legis-
lature has mandated that all base-load resources must be as efficient 
(on a carbon basis) as a combined-cycle unit, and that the costs of 
complying with this mandate are to be treated as compliance costs.141 
D. Non-ACES Federal Agency Rulemaking  
Separate from any rulemaking that may occur as a result of pass-
ing ACES, the EPA is currently considering rules and findings related 
to greenhouse gas emissions.  First, on October 30, 2009, the EPA 
promulgated a rule that requires certain facilities to report green-
house gas emissions to the EPA.142  “The data collected by this rule 
will also improve the U.S. government’s ability to formulate climate 
policies, and to assess which industries might be affected, and how 
these industries might be affected by potential policies.”143  Comply-
ing with the proposed rule has related costs, but many public utilities 
already track or report greenhouse emissions through EPA voluntary 
partnership programs144 or through state and regional programs.145  
Whether such costs are to be recovered in a public utility’s retail rates, 
however, is still ultimately subject to the state regulatory commission’s 
review and approval. 
On December 7, 2009, the EPA Administrator signed findings 
that greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, endanger public 
health and welfare.146  In AEP, discussed above, the Court considered 
 
 140. See id.  See also WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
THE WCI REGIONAL CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM (2008), http://www.westernclimate
initiative.org/the-wci-cap-and-trade-program/design-recommendations (describing 
the design recommendations for the WCI regional cap-and-trade program) [hereinaf-
ter WCI Design Recommendations].  
 141.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8340–41(West Supp. 2010).  But see Rebecca Smith 
& Keith Johnson, U.S. News: California Ties Cash to Energy, WALL STREET J., Jan. 12, 
2010, at A2 (explaining that a state panel proposes to compensate customers for 
higher energy prices essentially by collecting an emissions tax and paying the divi-
dends to consumers).   
 142. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,264–65 
(Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 87, 89).   
 143. Id. at 56,265. 
 144. Id.   
 145. Id. at 56,266.   
 146. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases 
Under Section 2020(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,516 (Dec. 15, 
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).  The EPA Administrator also found that 
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles contribute to greenhouse gas pol-
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whether the plaintiff’s nuisance cause of action had been displaced by 
federal legislation.147  The Court specifically considered EPA’s (at the 
time) proposed endangerment findings and concluded that because 
“[a] proposed finding has no effect in law that would affect any rights 
at issue here” the litigation could proceed.148  The Court, however, 
did not foreclose the possibility that climate change litigation could 
be displaced by regulation or legislation in the future—“[i]n sum, at 
least until EPA makes the requisite findings, for the purposes of our 
displacement analysis the CAA does not (1) regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions or (2) regulate such emissions from stationary sources” —
but it refused to opine on the issue were such regulations to be 
enacted.149  As such, the EPA’s rules could increase ACES-like com-
pliance costs, but may also reduce the potential for injunction-related 
costs resulting from a judicial order.150 
IV. COST RECOVERY FOR CARBON COSTS   
For public utilities dependent in any part on coal-fired genera-
tion for electricity, the costs of complying with an injunction, federal 
cap and trade legislation, or other type of carbon regulation are likely 
to be substantial.151  Public utilities, however, are regulated entities152 
 
lution and threaten public health and welfare.  Id. at 66,536.  These findings are an 
outgrowth of Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).   
 147. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (AEP), 582 F.3d 309, 371–88 (2d. Cir. 
2009).   
 148. Id. at 379.   
 149. Id. at 381.   
 150. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the EPA will be allowed to 
move forward with its regulations to limit greenhouse gas emissions. See Siobhan 
Hughes, Murkowski Holds Out Option of Vote on Plan to block EPA, WALL STREET J., Jan. 
12, 2010,  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126332127536126375.html (stating that 
Sen. Lisa Murkowski may seek a vote to stop the EPA’s regulations, and that the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce may sue the EPA over its decision to declare greenhouse gas-
es a danger to the public).  
 151. Current cost estimates for public utilities that are dependent on coal-fired 
electric generation are based on their annual carbon emissions.  For example, the 
largest current estimate is for Southern Co. which produces 149 million tons of CO2 a 
year.  Such an output would result in a potential $393 million annual cost under 
ACES.  See Cassandra Sweet, Southern Co. to Lose, Exelon to Gain Under US Cap and 
Trade-Study, http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/company-news-story.aspx?storyid=2009
11021655dowjonesdjonline000389 (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).  Additionally, utilities 
such as Duke and AEP are estimated to incur carbon costs equal to eleven and five 
percent of their operating incomes respectively.  Posting of John Lorinc to N.Y. Times 
Green Inc. Blog, http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/209/11/02/winners-and-losers-
of-cap-and-trade (Nov. 2, 2009, 14:44 EST).  It is unlikely that a public utility could 
absorb the disallowance of such costs without it affecting their ability to maintain a 
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and thus are typically unable to change their retail rates for service to 
recoup such costs without first demonstrating to a state regulatory 
commission that such a change is just and reasonable.153  Because such 
increases in retail rates are quite likely to be significant, they are also 
likely to be contested by some stakeholders.   
State regulatory commissions will be guided by state law and tra-
ditional regulatory principles to determine the reasonableness of a 
rate change that includes carbon costs.  In that context, state regula-
tory commissions will also be required to decide the appropriate me-
thod of implementing new environmental initiatives (such as ACES), 
which will include decisions on the recovery of related costs.  On re-
view, such decisions will be compared against long-standing precedent 
directing that rates must be reasonable for both customers and public 
utilities. 
A. Public Utilities: A Business “Affected with a Public Interest”  
For most private enterprise, the rates charged for goods and ser-
vices are determined by competitive forces that reflect market supply 
and demand.  Public utilities operate as monopolies within a geo-
graphic area and generally are not subject to the control of competi-
tive forces.  As a result, their rates for service are set through a quasi-
legislative process involving review by state regulatory commissions 
acting under broad powers conferred by the state legislature to de-
termine just and reasonable rates through an examination of the pub-
lic utility’s costs, which includes approving a reasonable rate of return 
on its investment.  While the rates set through this process are subject 
to judicial review, courts generally give deference to the expertise of 
the state regulatory commissions in its determination of fact in rate-
making proceedings.154   
 
reasonable return and to attract capital for future investments on reasonable terms.   
 152. Currently, fourteen states have adopted electric deregulation allowing for 
customer choice among electricity service providers.  See  Status of Electric Restructur-
ing by State, U.S. Energy Information Administration,  http://www.eia.doe.gov/
cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html (last visited Mar. 28, 
2010); see supra note 133 and Part IV (addressing classic rate regulation concepts ap-
plicable to public utilities operating in states that have not deregulated electric ser-
vice).  
 153.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 216B.03 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 757.282 (West 
2003); see also In re Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 05-0159, 2006 WL 192550, *35 
(Ill. Commerce Comm’n 2006) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 824(e) (2008)); In re Tex. Util. 
Elec. Co., No. 11735, 20 Tex. P.U.C. Bull. 1029, § XV (Tex. P.U.C. 1994).  
 154. See, e.g., Ass’n of Oil Pipe Lines v. F.E.R.C., 83 F.3d 1424, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (“Because the subject of our scrutiny is a ratemaking—and thus an agency de-
28
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It is well established that a state may, under its police power, re-
gulate a business affected with the public interest.155  Because the 
prime characteristic of a public utility is that of public use or service, a 
state may regulate and control a public utility to protect the public in-
terest and to promote the health, comfort, safety, and welfare of its 
inhabitants.156  This concept of regulating utility services is well estab-
lished.  In 1876, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which 
the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public 
an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by 
the public for the common good, to the extent of the inter-
est he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by dis-
continuing the use; but, so long as he maintains the use, he 
must submit to the control.157 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court relied heavily on English 
common law concepts which preserved in the Crown the right to re-
gulate private property where its use was offered for the public 
good.158  The Court also cited to English precedent that found where 
a monopoly existed for the public service, the importance of govern-
mental oversight was even more critical to ensuring reasonable terms 
in the absence of competitive forces.159   
 
cision involving complex industry analyses and difficult policy choices—the court will 
be particularly deferential to the Commission’s expertise.”) (quoting Time Warner 
Entm’t Co. v. F.C.C., 56 F.3d 151, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).  This deference also applies 
generally.  See, e.g., Kan. Gas & Elec. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 720 P.2d 1063, 1075 
(Kan. 1986) (noting that the KCC “must be afforded a wide discretion in the metho-
dology to be utilized in approaching the complex problems involved.  The field of 
public utility regulation is a highly complex field and requires a great amount of ex-
pertise in arriving at a result which is fair and just to all interested parties.”).  
 155. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (upholding the right of the state leg-
islature to fix the maximum charge for the storage of grain in public warehouses).  See 
also Chicago & G. T. Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892) (addressing the reason-
ableness of operating expenses in setting maximum passenger rates for railroad com-
panies). 
 156. See, e.g., Great N. Ry. Co. v. Washington, 300 U.S. 154 (1937); State v. Traffic 
Tel. Worker’s Fed’n of N.J., 66 A. 2d 616 (N.J. 1949); People’s Org. for Wash. Energy 
Res. v. Wash. Util. & Transp. Comm’n, 711 P.2d 319 (Wash. 1985).  
 157.  Munn, 94 U.S. at 126. 
 158. Id. at 126 (citing Lord Chief Justice Hale, De Portibus Maris, in 1 A 
COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND, FROM MANUSCRIPTS 45, 78 
(Francis Hargrave ed., 1787)).   
 159. Id. at 127–28 (citing Aldmutt v. Inglis, (1810) 12 East 527, 537 (Eng. Rep.) 
(stating that where a monopoly exists, the provider has a duty to perform the service 
on reasonable terms).   
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B. Traditional Utility Rate Regulation  
The principals from historical cases continue to guide the regula-
tion of public utilities, where the regulation of retail rates for service 
offered to the public remain subject to the oversight of a state regula-
tory commission.160  Utility retail rates must be reviewed by the state 
regulatory commission and found reasonable before those rates can 
be charged to customers.  In consideration of the reasonableness of a 
rate, the state regulatory commission will examine the costs of opera-
tion and the value of the utility property being used, and will deter-
mine a reasonable return on equity.161 
Rate regulation is based on the cost of providing service to cus-
tomers.  In formulaic terms, the principle of rate regulation can be 
expressed as: 
R = O + (V – D)*r 
R is the total revenue required to recover costs; O represents the 
operating costs, like fuel and labor; V  is the value of the utility proper-
ty; D is the accrued depreciation on that property; and r is the rate of 
return.162  Thus, a utility is generally allowed to recover operating costs 
and its investments in property (e.g., generation facilities).  The utility 
is also authorized to earn a return on its property investment.  Estab-
lishment of the total revenue that a utility is authorized to earn in-
volves determination of (1) the costs of operation, (2) the value of the 
property minus accrued depreciation (known as rate base), and (3) 
determination of a reasonable rate of return.163   
1. The Costs of Operation and Rate Base 
Operating expenses must be considered in determining whether 
rates are reasonable and provide a fair return to a public utility.164  
“[T]he Commission must examine every aspect of the [public] utili-
ty’s operations and the economic environment in which the utility 
 
 160. It is well established that the state regulatory commissions retain authority to 
regulate intrastate retail rates for utility service.  See Fed. Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edi-
son Co., 376 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1964); Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam 
& Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 91 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 161. See, e.g., In re Municipality of Anchorage, 19 P.U.R.4th 278, 281–82, 288 
(Alaska P.U.C. 1977). 
 162. PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 255.   
 163. Id.  See also State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Carolina Utils. Customers Ass’n, 524 
S.E.2d 10, 17–18 (N.C. 2000). 
 164. Office of People’s Counsel v. Md. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 733 A.2d 996, 999 
(Md. 1999). 
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functions to ensure that the [current or operating expense] data it 
has received [from the public utility] are representative of operating 
conditions that will, or should, prevail in future years.”165  In that 
process, the state regulatory commission will determine what specific 
charges and expenses to allow as costs of operation.166   
A public utility’s “rate base” is the amount of investment on 
which it is entitled to an opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable re-
turn.  It represents the total investment in, or the fair value of, the 
used and useful property that it necessarily devotes to rendering the 
regulated services.167  
In general, prudently incurred costs for operations and invest-
ments related to the provision of electricity service are included in re-
tail rates as part of the cost of generating the electricity used by cus-
tomers.168  The courts, however, have not set out specific line items to 
be included in retail electric rates as reasonable costs.  
The exact definition of prudence used when examining the pub-
lic utility’s decisions may vary by jurisdiction, but generally involves a 
review of the public utility’s actions at the time a decision was made 
that resulted in incurring a cost or making an investment.169  Such a 
determination is not intended to be a substitution of judgment for 
that of the public utility’s managers, and must be supported by a find-
ing that the public utility knew or should have known that its actions 
 
 165. U. S. Gypsum, Inc. v. Ind. Gas Co., Inc., 735 N.E.2d 790, 798 (Ind. 2000) (cit-
ing City of Evansville v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 339 N.E.2d 562, 570–71 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1975)). 
 166. See Ford Motor Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 562 N.W.2d 224, 229–30 (Mich. 
1997) (allowing utility to begin amortizing expenses accrued during a prior year for 
postretirement benefits was not unlawful or unreasonable). 
 167. See Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 262 U.S. 
276, 291(1923); Chesapeake Utils. Corp. v. Del. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 705 A.2d 1059, 
1066 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997); City of Miami v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 208 So. 2d 249 
(Fla. 1968); Heater of Seabrook, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of S.C., 503 S.E.2d 739, 
741–42 (S.C. 1998). 
 168. See, e.g., Galveston Elec. Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1922) (ex-
plaining that state and federal taxes are operating costs); Bus. & Prof’l People v. Ill. 
Commerce Comm’n, 585 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. 1991) (explaining that fuels costs are per-
haps the most significant operating expenses).   
 169. For example, one state regulatory commission defined this review as: 
The company’s conduct should be judged by asking whether the conduct 
was reasonable at the time, under all of the circumstances, considering that 
the company had to solve its problems prospectively rather than in reliance 
on hindsight.  In effect, our responsibility is to determine how reasonable 
people would have performed the task that confronted the company. 
PHILLIPS, supra note 3, at 341 (citing In re Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., No. 79-1, at 5–6 
(N.Y. 1979)). 
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were imprudent at the time of its decision.170  Absent a showing of im-
prudence, the public utility is presumed to have acted in good 
faith.171  
2. Rate of Return  
Generally, a public utility secures a fair return when its revenues 
are sufficient to pay operating expenses, to attract new investors, and 
to pay a fair return to its existing investors.172  Rates fixed by state reg-
ulatory commissions that are not sufficient to yield a fair or reasona-
ble return to a public utility are considered to be unjust, unreasona-
ble, and confiscatory, and their enforcement will deprive the public 
utility company of its property in violation of the Federal Constitu-
tion.173  In this respect, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Federal Constitution safeguard private property against a taking for 
public use, and neither the nation nor the state may take such proper-
ty of a public utility by means of the fixing of rates or charges that do 
not allow the public utility a reasonable rate of return upon the value 
of its property.  In determining the reasonable rate of return on rate 
base, two U.S. Supreme Court cases remain seminal authorities on 
this issue. 
a. Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public 
Service Commission 
In Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion,174 the U.S. Supreme Court provided a list of factors to be consi-
dered when setting a just and reasonable rate of return that have since 
been applied by federal and state regulatory commissions.  Bluefield 
Water Works & Improvement Company provided water to Bluefield, 
 
 170. Id. at 340–41 (citing In re W. Mass. Elec. Co., 80 P.U.R.4th 479, 501(Mass. 
D.P.U. 1986)). 
 171. W. Ohio Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935) (“In 
the absence of a showing of inefficiency or improvidence, a court will not substitute 
its judgment for theirs as to the measure of a prudent outlay.”).  
 172. United Water Del., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 723 A.2d 1172, 1174 (Del. 
1999) (citing Pub. Serv. Comm’n of State of Del. v. Wilmington Suburban Water 
Corp., 467 A.2d 446, 447 (Del. 1983)); In re Petition of PNM Gas Servs., 1 P.3d 383, 
391 (N.M. 2000). 
 173. See West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Balt. City, 295 U.S. 662, 668–
69 (1935); Ga. Power Co. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 396 S.E.2d 562, 580–81 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1990); KN Energy, Inc. v. Cities of Broken Bow, 505 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Neb. 
1993). 
 174. Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 
679 (1923). 
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West Virginia.175  The Public Service Commission of West Virginia set 
rates for the Bluefield Water Works considering lower construction 
costs in 1915 before World War I, instead of the higher construction 
costs in 1920 when Bluefield Water Works applied for the rate in-
crease.176  The company challenged the Public Service Commission’s 
rate order in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.177  Blu-
efield Water Works argued that the order violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it denied Blue Water Works property without 
just compensation and without due process of law.178  The West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals denied relief and dismissed the 
case.179  Bluefield Water Works appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.180 
In holding that the rate of return on Bluefield Water Works’ in-
vestment was too low and thus confiscatory,181 the Court explained:  
A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to 
earn a return on the value of the property which it employs 
for the convenience of the public equal to that generally be-
ing made at the same time and in the same general part of 
the country on investments in other business undertakings 
which are attended by corresponding, risks and uncertain-
ties, but it has no constitutional right to profits such as are 
realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or 
speculative ventures.182   
The Court continued, “The return should be reasonably suffi-
cient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and 
should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to 
maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money ne-
cessary for the proper discharge of its public duties.”183  Bluefield Water 
Works, along with Hope, continue today to provide the basic standard 
for the determination of the rate of return on rate base.   
 
 175. Id. at 683.   
 176. Id. at 689. 
 177. Id. at 683. 
 178. Id.   
 179. Id. 
 180. Id.   
 181. Id. at 695.  The Court also held that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals erred in failing to consider the higher costs of construction after World War I.  
Id. at 692.  This error is related, but not central to, the Court’s holding on the rate of 
return discussed infra notes 1822 and 1833 and related text.   
 182. Bluefield Water Works, 262 U.S. at 692–93.   
 183. Id. at 693.  Cf. Mkt. St. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945) (refusing 
to extend Bluefield Water Works’s holding to a business failure due to economic forces).   
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b. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.184 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Power Commission v. 
Hope Natural Gas Co.185 involved the Court’s consideration of a rate or-
der issued under the Natural Gas Act by the Federal Power Commis-
sion.186   
In 1938, the cities of Cleveland and Akron, Ohio filed complaints 
with the Federal Power Commission (FPC) alleging that the rates be-
ing collected by Hope Natural Gas Company through an affiliate dis-
tributing natural gas in Ohio were excessive and unreasonable.187  
Later that same year, the FPC instituted an investigation to determine 
the reasonableness of the rates charged.188  In 1939, the Public Utility 
Commission of Pennsylvania also filed a complaint with the FPC 
charging that the rates collected by Hope Natural Gas Company 
through an affiliate for natural gas service in Pennsylvania were un-
reasonable.189  At the conclusion of its investigation in 1942, the FPC 
issued an order requiring a $3,609,857 annual reduction in future 
rates, and established “just and reasonable” rates for each of the five 
affiliate companies providing retail natural gas service.190   
The FPC had found that 6.5% was a fair rate of return on the 
company’s investment.191  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
set aside the FPC’s order.192  In Hope, the Supreme Court reversed.  
The New Hope Gas Company failed to convince the Court that the 
FPC’s Order provided the company an unjust and unreasonable re-
turn on its investment.193   
 
 184. 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 593.  The Federal Power Commission was the predecessor to the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission.  Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. 
L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 567 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7382f (2008)).  Even 
though Hope focuses specifically on the Natural Gas Act, it has broader implications 
because the Court further defined the meaning of “just and reasonable” rates.  Hope, 
320 U.S. at 617. 
 187. Id. at 594. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 594–95. 
 190. Id. at 595.  In addition, the FPC established an interstate rate base of 
$33,712,526 that it found “represented the ‘actual legitimate cost’ of the company’s 
interstate property less depletion and depreciation and plus unoperated acreage, 
working capital and future net capital additions.”  Id. at 596. 
 191. Id. at 599.   
 192. Id. at 599–600.   
 193. Id. at 605.  See also id. at 602 (explaining that rate orders by the commission 
carry a presumption of validity “[a]nd he who would upset the rate order under the 
Act carries the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid because 
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While the Court did not cite Bluefield Water Works specifically, the 
Court echoed its holding: 
The rate-making process under the Act, i.e., the fixing of 
“just and reasonable” rates, involves a balancing of the in-
vestor and consumer interests.  Thus we stated in the Natu-
ral Gas Pipeline Co. case that “regulation does not insure 
that the business shall produce net revenues.”  But such 
considerations aside, the investor interest has a legitimate 
concern with the financial integrity of the company whose 
rates are being regulated.  From the investor of company 
point of view it is important that there be enough revenue 
not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs 
of the business.  These include service on the debt and divi-
dends on the stock.  By that standard the return to the equi-
ty owner should be commensurate with returns on invest-
ments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.  That 
return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence 
in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain 
its credit and to attract capital.194   
C. Recovery of Carbon-Related Costs  
The potential costs incurred by public utilities to comply with 
carbon initiatives are not discretionary, but rather will be a fixed re-
quirement of their continued operations.  As such, the determination 
of whether those costs should be included in retail rates is not just a 
determination of whether the public utility was prudent in incurring 
the expense; it must also recognize that the expense is a critical com-
ponent of providing electricity service to its customers.   
1. Injunction Costs  
If a public utility is enjoined from emitting carbon, it will have an 
immediate and dramatic impact on its operations.  To meet the de-
mand of its customers for electricity, it will need to purchase replace-
ment power that is carbon neutral while it determines a new resource 
plan.  Carbon-neutral replacement power is likely to be more costly 
than the power generated from the coal-fired generation that it will 
replace.195  Ultimately, the public utility will also likely incur costs re-
 
it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences”) (citations omitted).   
 194. Id. at 603 (citations omitted).   
 195. See LAZARD, LTD., LEVELIZED COST OF ENERGY ANALYSIS—VERSION 2.0 (2008), 
http://www.narucmeetings.org/Presentations/2008%20EMP%20Levelized%20Cost
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lated to building new generation facilities or modifying existing facili-
ties to generate electricity from a resource that emits less carbon.   
Unless shown to be imprudent, costs for purchasing power and 
building and maintaining generation facilities have traditionally been 
included in the cost of service and included in rates.196  In judging the 
prudency of the decision to incur costs, the state regulatory commis-
sions examine the circumstances under which the public utility made 
the decision to incur the cost.197  Because the decision to incur a cost 
will be the direct result of the public utility’s compliance with a judi-
cial order, the prudency of the costs should be viewed in the context 
of ensuring continued power supply for customers under the condi-
tions set forth by the court.  Therefore, while these decisions may in-
crease the cost of service and ultimately rates, the resulting costs 
should be recoverable.   
2. Compliance Costs  
If ACES or a similar federal carbon regulation is enacted, a public 
utility will have to consider the options previously outlined or pur-
chase carbon allowances to comply with the new regulation.  Includ-
ing the costs of carbon allowances in ratemaking would be consistent 
with the precedent supporting the recovery of compliance costs 
stemming from emission reduction and other environmental costs198 
and the specific cost-recovery policies in some of the RGGI/WCI 
states.   
For example, implementation of amendments to the Clean Air 
Act (CAA) resulted in a number of cases that confirmed the inclusion 
of costs resulting from the public utility’s compliance with federal en-
vironmental regulation in the determination of retail rates.199  These 
 
%20of%20Energy%20-%20Master%20June%202008%20(2).pdf.   
 196. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 216B.1636 (2008) (allowing recovery of electric utility 
infrastructure costs when a project replaces or modifies existing infrastructure and is 
shown to conserve energy or use energy more efficiently); MINN. STAT. § 216B.1645 
(2008) (allowing recovery of purchase power costs from ratepayers of utility, to the 
extent they are not offset by certain utility revenues); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. 
Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988).   
 197. See supra Part IV.B. 
 198. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 199. See Fla. Cities Water Co. v. State, 705 So. 2d 620, 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998) (noting that the utility commission must add the cost of environmental im-
provements that are required by federal or state government regulations to the rate 
base, to the extent that these improvements were made “in the public interest”); In re 
Conn. Light & Power Co., 191 P.U.R.4th 373, 494 (Conn. P.U.C. 1999) (allowing the 
utility to recover, in its rate base, costs incurred in purchasing emissions allowances 
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decisions acknowledge that while the state regulatory commissions 
have jurisdiction over retail intrastate rates, compliance with federal 
laws or regulations is generally considered a reasonable cost of opera-
tion.  Carbon regulation is thus analogous to CAA regulation of other 
emissions. 
Additionally, the carbon regulation process outlined in ACES is 
analogous to a type of environmental tax on generation.  Public utili-
ties have traditionally recovered validly imposed taxes as operating 
expenses for rate-making purposes,200 including property tax paid for 
a generation facility.201  The recognition of this expense in retail rates 
is based on the fact that payment of a legitimate tax is a requirement 
of the public utility’s continued operation of that facility.  Absent 
compliance, the facility would be closed.  The regulation of carbon 
under ACES would have a similar impact on generation facilities. 
Operating costs can also include costs for items not actually used 
in the generation of electricity if such items are found to be necessary 
for the operation of the generation plant.  In Senior Citizens Coalition of 
Northeastern Minnesota v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission,202 the 
Minnesota Supreme Court found that the costs of constructing public 
recreational facilities were a necessary part of generating electricity 
service from three hydroelectric plants.203  While the record reflected 
that the recreational facilities were not actually used in the generation 
of electricity or as part of the public utility’s generation or transmis-
sion facilities, they were required as a condition of the hydroelectric 
license granted by FERC.204  The court found that such facilities were 
 
for compliance with federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990); In re Ky. Utils. Co., 
242 P.U.R.4th 301, 315 (Ky. P.S.C. 2005) (holding that utility can recuperate, through 
a surcharge, money spent on emissions allowances necessary to comply with Clean Air 
Act Amendments of 1990).  But see In re Duke Energy Corp., 210 P.U.R.4th 311, 323 
(N.C. U.C. 2001) (holding that expenses related to purchase of federal emissions al-
lowances cannot be charged as fuel costs). 
 200. McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400 (1926); Miller v. R.R. 
Comm’n, 70 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1937); Office of People’s Counsel v. Md. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 733 A.2d 996 (Md. 1999); Minnegasco v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 549 
N.W.2d 904, 909 (Minn. 1996).  
 201. See In re Consumers Energy Co., 222 P.U.R.4th 303, 306 (Mich. P.S.C. 2002) 
(citing In re Provisions of § 10a(10) of 2000 PA 141, No. U-12639, 2001 WL 96161, 
exs. S-23, S-25, S-27, S-29 (Mich. P.S.C. Jan. 4, 2001)) (noting that plant property taxes 
are included in the category of “fixed costs”—along with generation and related 
regulatory assets, and production-related depreciation and amortization—that is re-
coverable through rate base via stranded cost computation);  see also In re Detroit Edi-
son Co., No. U-13350, 2003 WL 21791601, at *1 (Mich. P.S.C. July 31, 2003). 
 202. 355 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. 1984). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 299–300. 
37
Hertzler and Koeller: Who Pays for Carbon Costs? Uncertainty and Risk in Response to th
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
 
2010] WHO PAYS FOR CARBON COSTS? 941 
useful due to their mandatory nature, and stated: 
The problem with the PUC’s reasoning is that it defined 
“used . . . in rendering service” to require that an item must 
actually generate, transmit or distribute electricity, or aid in 
doing so.  We reject that definition as being overly technical 
and inflexible. . . . Under general principles of utility law, 
the “used and useful” standard simply requires (1) that the 
property be “in service,” and (2) that it “be ‘reasonably ne-
cessary’ to the efficient and reliable provision of utility ser-
vice.”  Thus, where, as here, an item of property is necessary 
for the continued operation of an electric generating facility 
according to valid federal licensing standards, we hold that 
such an item is “used and useful” . . . .205 
Under the reasoning in Senior Citizens Coalition, the costs of pur-
chasing carbon allowances should be included in the cost of service 
because purchasing an allowance is necessary for the continued oper-
ation of the plant.  Absent cost recovery, the public utility is placed in 
the position of having to choose between compliance with federal 
regulations and being able to afford such compliance. 
Similarly, mandated pollution-control facilities are not essential 
for the actual generation of electricity, but there is precedent support-
ing the inclusion of such costs in rates.206  In some states, these costs 
are explicitly recoverable from customers through rate riders autho-
rized by statute.207 
Further, disallowance of the cost of complying with federal car-
bon regulations will frustrate the purpose of those regulations by 
creating a related financial penalty for the public utility’s compliance.  
Past treatment of this issue has been to include the costs of com-
pliance in rates.208  Accordingly, if a public utility chooses to modify an 
existing coal-fired generation plant to use another resource that emits 
less carbon, or invest in other technology to reduce its carbon output, 
such costs should be considered in light of that utility’s overall efforts 
to comply with federal carbon emission regulations.  Otherwise, the 
 
 205. Id. at 300 (citations omitted).   
 206. See Senior Citizens Coal. of Ne. Minn. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 355 
N.W.2d 295, 300 (Minn. 1984); Green v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 473 A.2d 209, 213–
14 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984); In re Ky. Utils. Co., 242 P.U.R.4th 301, 315 (Ky. P.S.C. 
2005) (authorizing the utility to recover costs associated with constructing four scrub-
bers and for any new or additional pollution control equipment). 
 207. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 216B.683 (2008) (allowing cost recovery for additional 
costs in related to mercury reduction); MINN. STAT. § 216B.1692 (2008) (providing 
recovery of costs related to a qualifying emissions-reductions project).   
 208. See supra notes 199, 206–07 and accompanying text. 
38
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss3/9
 
942 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:3 
disallowance of cost can have a chilling effect on its capital invest-
ments,209 which could include new technologies that are necessary to 
substantively address the issue of climate change.210  In such an out-
come, the negative effects of a regulatory disallowance would be felt 
by a broader group than just public utilities and their customers, and 
would likely also impact the environmental cause that the carbon pol-
icy is meant to help.  
Finally, the examples found in the RGGI or WCI states that expli-
citly allow compliance costs to be recovered through retail rates con-
firm the necessity of providing public utilities with the means of reco-
vering costs associated with carbon compliance in order to give effect 
to their carbon policy initiatives.211  The states of Vermont, New 
Hampshire, and California all explicitly allow recovery of costs of 
complying with regional greenhouse gas initiates.212  These state sta-
tutes and regulatory pronouncements confirm that the need to en-
sure cost recovery is inseparable from effective carbon regulation.  If, 
however, stakeholders advocate against the inclusion of costs stem-
ming from ACES in ratemaking, the outcome may violate state laws 
that allow for the recovery of prudently incurred costs213 and raise 
 
 209. See Katarzyna Klimasinska, FPL Falls After Florida Ruling in Rate Case (Update 1), 
BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-01-14/fpl-
falls-after-florida-ruling-in-utility-rate-case-update2-.html (stating that FPL Group Inc. 
would suspend $10 billion in capital projects in Florida over the next five years after 
state regulators denied nearly all of its requested $1.3 billion rate increase request); 
Press Release, Florida Power & Light (FPL), Citing Deteriorating Regulatory Envi-
ronment, FPL Halts Billions of Dollars in Capital Expenditures in Florida (Jan. 13, 
2009), http://www.fpl.com/news/2010/011310.shtml.   
 210. Press Release, Duke Energy, Duke Energy Tests Solar Panels and New Smart 
Grid Technology in Charlotte (June 16, 2009), http://www.duke-
energy.com/news/releases/2009061602.asp; Press Release, Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 
PG&E to Study Wave Power In Humboldt & Mendocino (Feb. 28, 2007), 
http://www.pge.com/about/news/mediarelations/newsreleases/q1_2007/070228.sh
tml; Press Release, Xcel Energy, Xcel Energy Launches Groundbreaking Wind-to-
Battery Project (Feb. 28, 2008), 
http://www.xcelenergy.com/Colorado/Company/Newsroom/News%20Releases/Pa
ges/Xcel_Energy_launches_groundbreaking_wind_to_battery_project.aspx; Press Re-
lease, Xcel Energy, Xcel Energy Announces Six-Month Test Drive of Plug-in Hybrid 




 211. See supra Part III.C.2.  
 212. See supra notes 134, 135, 141 and accompanying text. 
 213. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 4-101(3) (2009); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 460.06a(2)–(7) (West 2002 & Supp. 2009); MINN. STAT. § 216B.16, sub-
div. 6 (2008); 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-211 to -213 (West 2007); S.D. CODIFIED 
39
Hertzler and Koeller: Who Pays for Carbon Costs? Uncertainty and Risk in Response to th
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
 
2010] WHO PAYS FOR CARBON COSTS? 943 
constitutional issues.214 
D. Mitigating Rate Impact 
All commentators agree that ACES will increase the cost for 
energy and energy-intensive goods and services; the debate among 
them is in regard to the amount that increase may take.215  Estimates 
range from $98 to $3100 per household annually, leaving one certain-
ty: the impact of ACES will be significant.  The impacts from other 
types of carbon regulation discussed in this article have not been simi-
larly estimated but are also likely to be significant. 
ACES itself appears to acknowledge the rate impact potential by 
offering two forms of customer relief: (1) the bill allocates more than 
one-third of the total allowances to retail natural gas and electric utili-
ty companies to provide their customers with relief on their utility 
bills; (2) proceeds from the sale of fifteen percent of the emissions al-
lowances to provide targeted assistance to low-income households for 
the higher costs they will face for energy and energy-intensive goods 
and services.216  Whether these measures are sufficient to fully mitigate 
the scope of expected rate increases will vary depending on the facts 
of each individual case. 
The issue of mitigating rate impact resulting from cap and trade 
regulation has been raised previously in the context of RGGI and 
WCI.  In New York, the state legislature is considering a bill that 
would allocate $112 million received from auctioning carbon credits 
under RGGI to subsidize home energy-efficiency renovations for 
energy customers, thus reducing energy usage and the related 
amount owed for benefiting households.217  California has a proposal 
to contribute seventy-five percent of an expected $20 billion in annual 
 
LAWS § 49-34A-100 (Supp. 2009); TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 36.051, 36.052 (Vernon 
2007). 
 214. See infra Part IV.E. 
 215. See D’Angelo Gore, Cap-And-Trade Cost Inflation, FACTCHECK.ORG, May 28, 
2009, http://www.factcheck.org/2009/05/cap-and-trade-cost-inflation/ (quoting var-
ious cap and trade cost estimates); see also Op-Ed, Who Pays for Cap and Trade? WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 9, 2009, at A18 (stating that a 15% cut in carbon emissions would result in 
price increases of $680, or 3.3% of after-tax income for households in the bottom-
income quintile, $800 and $1,500, or 2.9% to 2.7% for the three middle quintiles, 
and a 1.7% increase for the top quintile).  
 216. American Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 782 
(2009).   
 217. Posting of Steve Zweig to HeatingOil.com, http://www.heatingoil.com/
blog/york-bill-cap-trade-income-energysaving-projects/#more-2600 (Sept. 15, 2009, 
15:48 EST).  
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revenue from the state’s proposed cap-and-trade measures back to 
state residents.218  The California proposal addresses many of the con-
cerns surrounding carbon regulation, including the expectation that 
an energy tax will have the greatest impact on low-income households 
in that state.219  These efforts and others are clearly a response to the 
increases expected in energy and energy-intensive goods and services 
from carbon regulation. 
If ACES is enacted, or other forms of carbon regulation result in 
significant costs, the impact to electricity customers should be consi-
dered holistically in order to determine whether these or other meas-
ures should occur to mitigate the potential for rate impact.  In that 
debate, the state regulatory commissions are well situated to convene 
a generic stakeholder proceeding to consider such mitigating options 
as increases in customer aid for low-income and fixed-income cus-
tomers, conservation assistance, and timing any rate increase with 
credits.  Ideally, a comprehensive approach would be determined 
prior to the need for a rate increase request by a public utility operat-
ing in the state.  Such coordination would facilitate the state regulato-
ry commission’s full consideration of both the rate increase and the 
existing options for mitigating the potential for negative conse-
quences to customers of the related rate impact. 
E. The Constitutional Significance of the Result 
If a state regulatory commission order were to exclude costs re-
sulting from carbon regulation from the public utility’s cost of service, 
the reasonableness of such a decision would generally be reviewed 
under state law or traditional regulatory standards.220  If, however, the 
financial result of an adverse regulatory decision is significant, affect-
ing the risk to the public utility’s investors, it may also raise constitu-
 
 218. Posting of Margot Roosevelt to L.A. Times Greenspace Blog, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010/01/cap-and-trade-california.html 
(Jan. 11, 2010, 17:23 PST) (citing a report from an advisory committee to the Califor-
nia Air Resources Board). 
 219. Rebecca Smith & Keith Johnson, California: May Pay Consumers for Carbon 
Cuts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2010, at A2 (stating that a family of four would receive an 
estimated $388 in 2012, rising to $1036 by 2020).  
 220. Deference is generally shown by a reviewing court to a state regulatory agen-
cy’s determination of facts related to its area of expertise.  See Reserve Mining Co. v. 
Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 824 (Minn. 1977) (finding that an agency’s expertise is en-
titled to deference from reviewing courts and that the agency’s decision is presumed 
correct); Brinks, Inc. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 355 N.W.2d 446, 449 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1984) (stating that substantial deference is accorded to the fact finding process 
of an administrative agency); see also supra note 154. 
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tional issues.  
In Hope, the Supreme Court focused on the result of the rate re-
view, rather than the process by which the rates were analyzed, and 
emphasized that the end result was critical in determining the reason-
ableness of rates: 
The fixing of prices, like other applications of the police 
power, may reduce the value of the property which is being 
regulated.  But the fact that the value is reduced does not 
mean that the regulation is invalid.  It does, however, indi-
cate that “fair value” is the end product of the process of 
rate-making, not the starting point as the Circuit Court of 
Appeals held.  The heart of the matter is that the rates can-
not be made to depend upon “fair value” when the value of 
the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever 
rates may be anticipated.221 
In explaining its focus, the Court drew an important distinction 
between adherence to a particular formula and the actual impact of 
the rate order.  If the total effect of the rate order is not unreasona-
ble, the Court determined that any subsequent judicial inquiry on 
constitutional grounds as to the method used to reach that result was 
at an end.  The fact that the method employed may contain what it 
termed as “infirmities” was unimportant.222   
In examining the effect of the FPC’s order on Hope Natural Gas 
Company, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, 
determining that the rates authorized were just and reasonable, hold-
ing that “[r]ates which enable the company to operate successfully, to 
maintain its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate 
its investors for the risks assumed certainly cannot be condemned as 
invalid, even though they might produce only a meager return on the 
so-called ‘fair value’ rate base.”223 
The conclusion literally drawn from this language is that a state 
regulatory commission need not use any specific standard for the de-
termination of the value of rate base nor allow recovery of specific op-
erating expenses to satisfy constitutional requirements, so long as the 
end reached is reasonable.   
Forty-five years after Hope, the Supreme Court issued another crit-
 
 221. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 601 (citations omit-
ted). 
 222. Id. at 602; see also Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 310 (1989) 
(citing Hope to affirm that the fact that “the method employed to reach that result 
may contain infirmities is not then important”).  
 223. Hope, 320 U.S. at 319. 
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ical opinion on the constitutional standards for review of regulated 
rates in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,224 which involved the state public 
utilities commission decision to allow the inclusion of costs incurred 
by two power company participants to a joint venture formed to build 
seven nuclear power plants.225  Four of the seven planned plants ulti-
mately were not built and were not used in the provision of electricity 
to customers.  On appeal, the Consumer Advocate argued against the 
inclusion of costs associated with these canceled plants in rates for 
electricity because these plants were never “used and useful” in ser-
vice to the public.226  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania agreed with 
the arguments raised by the Consumer Advocate and reversed the de-
cision of the Commonwealth Court.227  In doing so, the court rejected 
the power company’s arguments that disallowing rate recovery would 
constitute an unlawful taking and was unconstitutional.228 
In affirming the Pennsylvania court, the U.S. Supreme Court af-
firmed its past statements in Hope that the effect of the decision, not 
its components, determined its constitutional status.229  The Court did 
not absolve the state regulatory commission of its obligation to make a 
sound decision based on a developed record, so much as acknowledge 
that the only way to evaluate the soundness of that decision is to weigh 
the effect of the final outcome: 
The economic judgments required in rate proceedings are 
often hopelessly complex and do not admit of a single cor-
rect result.  The Constitution is not designed to arbitrate 
these economic niceties.  Errors to the detriment of one par-
ty may well be canceled out by countervailing errors or al-
lowances in another part of the rate proceeding.  The Con-
stitution protects the utility from the net effect of the rate 
order on its property.  Inconsistencies in one aspect of the 
methodology have no constitutional effect on the utility’s 
property if they are compensated by countervailing factors 
in some other aspect.230 
In Duquesne, the Court found that neither power company had al-
 
 224. 488 U.S. 299 (1989). 
 225. Id. at 305.  In 1980 and 1981, Duquesne Light Company sought to amortize 
over a ten-year period $34,697,389 in costs related to the canceled power plants.  Id. 
at 302.  Penn Power also sought the opportunity to amortize $9,569,665 over a ten-
year period for similar costs.  Id. at 304.   
 226. Cohen v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 494 A.2d 58, 61 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995). 
 227. Barasch v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 532 A.2d 325 (Pa. 1987). 
 228. Dusquesne, 488 U.S. at 305. 
 229. Id. at 310. 
 230. Id. at 314. 
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leged that the total effect of the rate order was either unjust or unrea-
sonable, and that the overall effect was well within the bounds of Hope 
even with the total exclusion of the costs associated with the canceled 
plants.231  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court’s deci-
sion.232 
After Hope and Duquesne, the determinative question on review of 
a rate order issued by a state regulatory commission is not whether a 
specific cost was prudently incurred and useful in the provision of ser-
vice, but whether the omission of that cost by the state regulatory 
commission triggered an overall result that is so unreasonable as to 
confiscate property in violation of the Takings Clause under either 
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.233   
Not all costs excluded by a state regulatory commission in rate 
making proceedings rise to this level.  The anticipated costs resulting 
from the implementation of a federal cap-and-trade regulation, how-
ever, are estimated to be considerable.  Denial of costs representing a 
significant amount of a public utility’s annual income could implicate 
constitutional protections. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Historically, operating costs associated with the production of 
electricity have been included in the rate making process overseen by 
the state regulatory commissions.234  The inclusion of these costs re-
cognizes that public utilities provide a service to customers for which 
they should be compensated.  Where the federal or state government 
has implemented environmental restrictions on the generation of 
electricity, these costs have been included in the calculation of retail 
 
 231. Id. at 311.  Duquesne was authorized to earn a 16.14% return on common 
equity and an 11.64% overall return on a rate base of nearly $1.8 billion.  Id. Its $35 
million investment in the cancelled plants comprised of roughly 1.9% of its total base, 
and the denial of plant amortization reduced its annual allowance by 0.4%.  Id. at 
312. 
 232. Id. at 316. 
 233. Id. at 307–08 (citing Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 
U.S. 578, 597 (1896) (declaring that a rate is too low if it is “so unjust as to destroy the 
value of [the] property for all the purposes for which it was acquired,” and in so 
doing “practically deprive[s] the owner of property without due process of law”)); 
FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391–392 (1974) (“All that is protected against, in a 
constitutional sense, is that the rates fixed by the Commission be higher than a con-
fiscatory level.”); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942) (“By long 
standing usage in the field of rate regulation, the ‘lowest reasonable rate’ is one 
which is not confiscatory in the constitutional sense.”). 
 234. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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rates paid by customers to give effect to those regulations.235  Includ-
ing these costs in retail rates recognizes that environmental policies 
will not be successful without also providing a means for the affected 
utility to continue to provide service and earn a reasonable return.   
At this point, the ultimate cost impacts of carbon initiatives are 
far from clear and depend largely on individual facts and future ac-
tion by courts, Congress, federal agencies, and state regulatory com-
missions.236  But the issue of cost recovery is of critical importance to 
the success of any carbon regulation.  Without assurances that these 
costs will be recognized for ratemaking purposes, public utilities face 
considerable risks related to their investment status and, as a result, 
the future costs of their operations.  Thus, it is crucial that a compre-
hensive approach to cost recovery should be developed.  This com-
prehensive approach can be developed through the Senate’s consid-
eration of ACES (or similar federal legislation), subsequent 
rulemaking by federal agencies, or through consistent application by 
the state regulatory commissions in regulatory ratemaking proceed-
ings.  
Also important is recognizing that the recovery of carbon regula-
tion costs will significantly increase the rates paid by electricity cus-
tomers.237  This issue cannot be effectively managed by disallowing 
cost recovery for such costs.  While a disallowance of cost may tempo-
rarily reduce the potential rate impact for customers, it would also 
have significant impacts on the public utility’s operations and result in 
potential judicial challenges.  Additionally, the public utility would 
likely see a degradation of its credit status, which will necessarily result 
in increases to the cost of credit and investment and, ultimately, high-
er retail rates. The public utility may also have to suspend its capital 
investments, including any investments in new technologies that are 
necessary to address the issue of climate change.  A better alternative 
is to consider both the rate increase and rate impact mitigation (such 
as ACES allowances) together.  This allows for the development of a 
comprehensive implementation strategy that supports full realization 
of the environmental policy. 
For these reasons, efforts to mitigate the impact of carbon regula-
tion on public utilities and electricity customers should not occur pie-
cemeal or on an ad hoc basis, but as a part of a holistic approach to 
 
 235. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
 236. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 237. See discussion infra Part IV.E. 
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implementing new federal policy on carbon regulation.  The ultimate 
success of such legislation will depend on a consistent solution.   
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